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Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?
EVIDENCE FROM COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
John Mikhail†
Is morality universal, and should the law care? The topic
of this Symposium could be addressed from many vantage
points. In this Essay, I sketch one approach that seems to me
both interesting and fruitful, while nonetheless recognizing that
it is merely one among many possible avenues to explore in this
rich vein.
†
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Whether moral universals exist is one of history’s most
widely debated topics. Virtually everyone has an opinion about
it, and much ink has been spilled over the matter. Among
serious researchers, one might expect that broad and vaguely
defined questions like this would give way to more narrowly
focused inquiries; for example, whether any specific acts, such as
murder, are universally prohibited, and if so whether the
content of these prohibitions is largely uniform across cultures
or varies significantly among different societies. This way of
framing the inquiry shifts the focus, at least initially, from
morality to law, on the assumption that the law frequently “is
the witness and external deposit of our moral life”1 and that at
least some crimes and other legal prohibitions rest on
“immemorial ideas of right and wrong.”2 Their legal pedigree
may depend on official recognition or positive enactment, but
their ultimate source is rooted in customary morality or
customary law. This formulation also substitutes a tractable
empirical question for a potentially interminable philosophical
debate. Presumably there is an answer to the question of how
uniform or widespread certain legal prohibitions are, for which a
range of compelling evidence can be brought to bear. It seems
reasonable to assume, therefore, that one might make some
progress on the question presented by examining the various
penal codes that exist throughout the world and determining the
precise extent to which they overlap with respect to particular
acts, such as murder or other forms of homicide.
Surprisingly, hardly any systematic research has been
done to examine this question. The leading social scientific
studies of homicide, such as Martin Daly and Margo Wilson’s
Homicide3 or Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner’s Violence and
Crime in Cross-National Perspective,4 contain many valuable
insights, but they do not squarely address the existence of
substantive moral or legal universals or their codification in
positive law. Daly and Wilson’s study is mainly concerned with
the behavioral profile and evolutionary psychology of homicide,
of who kills and why, while Archer and Gartner’s book is focused
primarily on homicide rates, that is, on recorded patterns of
homicide and other violent crimes in different cultural contexts.
1

O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 292 (2nd ed. 1961).
3
MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988).
4
DANE ARCHER & ROSEMARY GARTNER, VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN CROSSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1984).
2

2009]

IS THE PROHIBITION OF HOMICIDE UNIVERSAL?

499

Neither volume seeks to describe a shared blueprint for
considered judgments about homicide or their basis in human
moral cognition. Although anthropologists, cognitive scientists,
and other researchers have occasionally undertaken to study in
general terms the role of intent, causation, and other elements of
blame and responsibility in different cultural contexts, the
ethnographic record is likewise largely devoid of the kind of
detailed analysis of mens rea, actus reus, and available defenses
or their civil law counterparts that might uncover the precise
structure of a universal prohibition against homicide or its basis
in human cognitive capacities.5 As a result, even answers to
relatively simple questions, such as whether every known
society utilizes an intent requirement or recognizes some kind of
insanity, necessity, or mistake of fact defense, remain elusive
and unavailable.
For their part, legal scholars have also generally failed to
investigate the potential global reach of a specific, structured
homicide prohibition. At least two major factors appear
responsible for this puzzling state of affairs. First, as a general
matter, comparative criminal law is a relatively neglected and
underdeveloped discipline; those studies that do exist are mainly
concerned with procedural rather than substantive law.6 Second,
legal reform rather than accurate description has often been at
the heart of comparative research.7 To take a typical example,
Professor Stanley Yeo recently compared the mens rea elements
for murder under the Canadian and Indian codes with those
proposed by an Australian law reform body.8 He found the
existing Canadian code deficient in multiple respects and
proposed a number of specific improvements, including removing
two superfluous phrases and adding a fault element based on
5

See, e.g., E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 286 (Atheneum 1968) (1954) (concluding without further
elaboration that specific forms of justified and unjustified killing are universal); Margaret
Mead, Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law, 6 NAT. LAW F. 51,
52 (1961) (same); see also DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991); MAX
GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 204-41 (1965); Clyde Kluckhohn,
Common Humanity and Diverse Cultures, in THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 245 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1959); Frederic Maitland, The Early History of Malice
Aforethought, 8 L. MAG. & REV. 406 (1883), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERIC MAITLAND 304 (1911).
6
See Markus Dirk Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1308-09 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman
eds., 2006).
7
Id. at 1302-05.
8
Stanley Yeo, “Murder” She Said: Canadian, Indian and Australian
Formulations of the Fault Elements for Murder, 49 U.N.B.L.J. 21 (2000).

500

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:2

recklessness alone.9 Another representative study by Professor
Alison Young analyzes the legal defenses available to battered
women who kill their abusers in England and in Canada,
advocating the reform of English law in light of recent
developments in the Canadian Supreme Court.10 Likewise, two
academics in New Zealand recently examined the jurisprudence
of New Zealand and South Africa with regard to the lawfulness
of homicide committed while effecting arrests.11 The authors
explain that their primary objective is to reduce the number of
homicides occurring in the course of making an arrest.12
Although isolated and narrowly circumscribed doctrinal articles
like these possess considerable practical value, they fail to speak
directly to the broader scientific question at issue.
More comprehensive studies in comparative criminal law
also tend to have a practical and reform-minded orientation. The
monumental sixteen-volume “Comparative Depiction of German
and Foreign Criminal Law” published under the direction of the
German Justice Ministry from 1905 to 1909, for instance, was
designed in connection with the reform of the German criminal
code.13 Although it contains a great deal of relevant information,
it is not conceived or organized in a manner that is particularly
useful to those researchers in anthropology, cognitive science,
experimental philosophy, or related fields who might seek to
identify moral universals or to elaborate modern conceptions of
universal jurisprudence. Other large-scale projects follow the
same pattern. For example, Homicide Law in Comparative
Perspective,14 an informative volume edited by Professor Jeremy
Holder, consists of a collection of essays arising out of reform
proposals of the Law Commission for England and Wales. Each
contributor analyzes the law of homicide in his or her respective
jurisdiction. Although the precise structure of the homicide
prohibition and its various fault elements are given serious
attention, the dominant orientation remains legislative reform.
9

Id. at 32.
Alison Young, Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative
Analysis, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 761 (1993).
11
Michael Spisto & Fran Wright, (Justifiable) Homicide Whilst Effecting an
Arrest: When is this Lawful? A Comparison between the South African and New Zealand
Systems of Law, 7 WAIKATO L. REV. 147 (1999).
12
Id.
13
See generally VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN UND
AUSLÄNDISCHEN STRAFRECHTS: VORARBEITEN ZUE DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTREFORM
(1905-1909), cited and discussed by Dubber, supra note 6, at 1303.
14
HOMICIDE LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Jeremy Holder ed., 2007).
10
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Further, only nine jurisdictions are represented. Needless to say,
while this type of comparative research can be suggestive, it is
an insufficient basis on which to ground controversial claims
about human universals or cause the broader scientific
community to sit up and take notice.
The foregoing review highlights another limitation of the
existing literature on comparative criminal law: it is often
restricted to nations or cultures that fall within a particular
geographic region or share a common legal history, in particular
that of European colonialism. The comparative enterprise
spawned by the spread of English common law is probably the
most familiar modern example of this phenomenon, but the
same holds true of French, German, and other influential
systems of law.15 In these colonial and post-colonial settings,
comparative scholars have typically examined isolated topics of
interest, such as the law of reckless homicide or the variable role
of provocation as a mitigating plea to homicide in
Commonwealth countries.16 Once again a sound basis for
significant generalizations that might cut broadly across
cultural, geographic, or historical boundaries appears to be
lacking.
To be sure, a few scattered studies exist that have
extended our intellectual horizons somewhat beyond the
relatively narrow constraints that characterize most
comparative research. In 1912, Professor D. Oswald Dykes
surveyed the homicide classifications of several unrelated
jurisdictions, including England, Scotland, continental Europe,
the United States, and India.17 Another early article by Professor
Charles Lobinger examined the law of homicide in England,
France, Spain, Germany, Japan, and China.18 More recently,
Professor Igor Andrejew’s analysis of criminal law in socialist
15

German scholars, for instance, were among the founders of legal
anthropology, and they developed a keen interest in customary tribal law in Africa and
elsewhere. See, e.g., Andrew Lyall, Early German Legal Anthropology: Albert Hermann
Post and His Questionnaire, 52 J. AFRICAN LAW 114 (2008). The classic illustration of
common legal origins, of course, is the Roman law foundation of virtually all Western and
many non-Western legal systems. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW
AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1991).
16
See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, Commonwealth Innovations on the Law of
Provocation, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 184 (1975); M. Sornarajah, Reckless Murder in
Commonwealth Law, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 846 (1975).
17
D. Oswald Dykes, Classifications of Homicide—A Study in Comparative Law,
24 JURID. REV. 184 (1912-1913).
18
Charles Sumner Lobingier, The Homicide Concept—A Study in Comparative
Criminal Law, 9 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1918-1919).
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countries utilized common political and economic structures as
criteria for analyzing penal systems not only in former Eastern
Bloc countries, but also in Mongolia, North Korea, China, and
North Vietnam.19
In addition, the federalist system of the United States
has long afforded an opportunity for sustained comparative
analysis, albeit of a domestic and highly integrated variety. For
example, the nineteenth century witnessed the publication of a
number of useful treatises in the United States dedicated to the
law of homicide, and these volumes often included a significant
comparative dimension.20 Likewise, the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code is, in effect, a substantial
comparative project that seeks to organize and reform the body
of common and statutory law that has accumulated over several
centuries in both state and federal jurisdictions.21 This massive
effort has had a major influence on legal education throughout
the English-speaking world and beyond, and it has inspired
similar projects in Latin America and elsewhere.22 Finally, in
recent years leading criminal law theorists such as Markus
Dubber,23 George Fletcher,24 Stuart Green,25 and other scholars
have begun to call for a more sustained engagement with
foreign, international, and transnational materials, and many of
them have made significant contributions toward that end.26
From a scientific perspective, however, even these more
ambitious scholarly endeavors comprise relatively limited and
19

IGOR ANDREJEW, DROIT PÈNAL COMPARÉ DES PAYS SOCIALISTS, (Maciej
Szepietowski, trans.) (1981).
20
See, e.g., FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, Kaye & Brother, 1855); THE MICHIE CO., A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE (1914); JAMES M. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
(New York & Albany, Banks & Brothers, 1891).
21
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE.
22
JUAN BUSTOS RAMIREZ & MANUEL VALENZUELA BEJAS, LE SYSTÈME PENAL
DES PAYS DE L’AMERIQUE LATINE 7 (Jacqueline Bernat de Celis trans., 1983).
23
See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 6; see also MARKUS DUBBER & MARK KELMAN,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); Markus D. Dubber,
Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2006).
24
See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL: FOUNDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter FLETCHER, THE
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW]; GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW
(1998) [hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW].
25
See, e.g., Stuart Green, The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2104 (1998) (reviewing FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
24).
26
For one notably impressive effort in this direction, see DAVID LUBAN, JULIE
R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2010).
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piecemeal investigations, particularly when measured against
analogous fields like comparative linguistics. Significantly, none
of these efforts have been so bold as to hypothesize and then
systematically investigate the possible universal structure of the
homicide prohibition, let alone its potential reflection of innate
moral capacities.
These preliminary remarks supply a useful framework
for introducing the novel research project in cognitive science
and comparative criminal law summarized in the remainder of
this Essay. Drawing on several years of intensive work, my
research assistants and I have begun to fill a major gap in the
literature and thereby help to advance our theoretical
understanding of moral and legal universals—and, ultimately, of
the evolutionary, neurocognitive, and cultural processes that
generate and support them—by examining how the prohibition
of homicide is codified in several hundred jurisdictions
throughout the world, including all of the 204 member-states of
the United Nations and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.27 Among other objectives, our study seeks to
identify the proportion of jurisdictions that criminalizes one or
more forms of homicide and that includes a mental state
element in their definition of criminal homicide. The study also
seeks to examine the prevalence and substance of specific
justifications and excuses, including eight of the most prominent
legal defenses: (1) self-defense, (2) necessity, (3) insanity or
mental illness, (4) duress or compulsion, (5) provocation, (6)
intoxication, (7) mistake of fact, and (8) mistake of law.
Although this research program is still unfolding, the
main provisional finding thus far is that the prohibition of
homicide does appear to be both universal and highly invariant,
at least within the parameters of our investigation, which is
restricted to codified law and excludes other sources of legal
norms, such as custom or case law, and which is aimed primarily
at uncovering broad generalizations related to the foregoing
categories, rather than identifying other, more specific
differences. In particular, all of the jurisdictions investigated
thus far do appear to criminalize one or more forms of homicide.
In addition, all of these jurisdictions do appear to include a
27

The project was conceived over ten years ago in connection with some
comparative research on the law of homicide that I undertook in law school and later
published in the Stanford Law Review. See generally John Mikhail, Law, Science and
Morality: A Review of Richard Posner’s ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1098-1110 (2002).
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mental state element in their definitions of unlawful homicide.
That is, none of the jurisdictions investigated thus far adopt a
purely strict liability approach to unlawful homicide.
In addition, the particular justifications and excuses
identified thus far in our research are remarkably similar and
appear to consist of a relatively short list of familiar categories,
including the eight main defenses enumerated above. Among
other things, this suggests that the specific circumstances in
which intentional killing is held to be justified or excused may be
far more constrained than many commentators have implied.28
On the other hand, there does appear to be significant diversity
with respect to some of these defenses, at least at the level of
codified law. Specifically, although some of the most common
defenses, such as self-defense and insanity/mental illness,
appear to be universal or nearly so, other categories, such as
necessity, duress and provocation, appear somewhat less
prevalent.
The main provisional results of the study are exhibited in
Table 1, which supplies a representative sample of 41 of the 205
jurisdictions (i.e., 20%) included thus far in our research. As
Table 1 implies, the methods employed in our investigation were
relatively simple and straightforward. An alphabetical list of
countries was compiled and the relevant provisions of each
jurisdiction’s penal code were located using a variety of sources,
including collections such as The American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes,29 websites such as that of the Buffalo Criminal Law
Center,30 and other available print and web resources. Each set
of provisions was copied or transcribed into a single master
document, which eventually ran to over one thousand pages.31
Whenever possible, official English translations of non-English
codes were utilized. In the case of those countries for which no
English translation was available, researchers copied or
transcribed the relevant code provisions in the available

28

See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 121 (1999); Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Nativism and Moral Psychology: Three
Models of the Innate Structure that Shapes the Contents of Moral Norms, in 1 MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 319-44 (W.
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
29
See generally 1-29 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1960-1987).
30
Buffalo Criminal Law Center, http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/ (last visited
Feb. 18, 2010).
31
See John Mikhail, Homicide: A Universal Prohibition (tentative title) (March
8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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language and then translators supplied provisional English
translations.
Using the criteria listed below, researchers then analyzed
the code provisions, seeking to determine whether each of the
following seven categories was satisfied by a given jurisdiction.
As an initial matter, we limited our attention to whether a given
jurisdiction criminalizes homicide, whether its definition of
homicide includes a mental state element, and whether it
recognizes the defenses of self-defense, insanity/mental illness,
necessity, duress, and provocation. Intoxication, mistake of fact,
and mistake of law are therefore not included in the following
analysis. All of the seven categories that were utilized in the
study are, of course, open to multiple interpretations, but three
of them especially so: necessity, duress, and whether the given
jurisdiction includes a mental state requirement in its definition
of homicide. As a rough first cut, therefore, a decision was made
to analyze these three categories using two sets of criteria, one
more restrictive and the other more inclusive. Both sets of
criteria are given below.
1. Criminal Homicide
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction
make the killing of a human being a crime?
Results: 41/41 (100%) of tabulated jurisdictions
criminalize homicide.
2. Mental Element to Homicide
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available
codified laws of the jurisdiction incorporate the mental state of
the offender (e.g., intent, malice, etc.) into its definition of
murder or other forms of criminal homicide? Codes which
include a separate offense of “unintentional” or “negligent”
homicide, or similar offenses, are included by negative
implication. In addition, codes which limit criminal liability to
acts committed with intent in a general part or other general
section of the code, unless otherwise specified by law, are also
included.
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions include a
mental element in their definition of criminal homicide.
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus
jurisdictions that supply a mental element requirement
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indirectly, for example, by means of a general mistake of fact
provision that exempts an offender from criminal liability, or
jurisdictions for which a mental element is otherwise implied.
Jurisdictions that distinguish separate crimes for murder and
manslaughter, without corresponding definitions, are also
included.
Results: 41/41 (100%) of tabulated jurisdictions include a
mental element to homicide, including indirect or implied
elements.
3. Self-Defense (or Defense of Others)
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction
allow for justification, excuse, or reduced punishment if the act
was committed in defense of self or others? These criteria may
be satisfied by provisions that identify self-defense or defense of
others as a complete defense or by provisions that provide for
mitigated punishment. Jurisdictions that explicitly state that
self-defense or defense of others is a mitigating factor are
included, even if the degree of mitigation is left to the
discretionof the judge. Jurisdictions that provide blanket grants
of discretion to the judge for generic or unspecified mitigating
factors, however, are not included. Also excluded in this
tabulation are provisions which more closely resemble
provocation defenses, even though many of these provisions
might be applicable in situations of self-defense as well. Codes
with necessity-like defensive force provisions were evaluated on
a case-by-case basis.
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
stated criteria for Self Defense (or Defense of Others).
4. Insanity or Mental Illness
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction
allow for justification, excuse, or reduced punishment based on
the insanity, mental illness, or other mental incapacity of the
offender? These criteria may be satisfied by provisions that
identify insanity or mental illness as a complete defense or by
provisions that mitigate punishment based on these
characteristics or some analogous mental incapacity. Codes that
explicitly state that insanity, mental illness, or other mental
incapacity is a mitigating factor are included, even if the degree
of mitigation is left to the discretion of the judge. Jurisdictions
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that provide blanket grants of discretion to the judge for generic
or unspecified mitigating factors, however, are not included.
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
stated criteria for Insanity / Mental Illness.
5. Necessity
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available
codified laws of the jurisdiction allow for justification, excuse, or
reduced punishment if the act was committed in circumstances
in which a defendant commits a crime or causes harm to a
protected interest for the purpose or with the foreseeable effect
of avoiding a greater crime, harm, or evil? Jurisdictions that
provide for a similar defense defined in terms of reasonableness
or under the heading of “choice of evils,” “emergency,” or “state
of necessity,” without further elaboration, are included.
Results: 25/41 (61%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
stated criteria for Necessity.
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus
jurisdictions that refer to an “irresistible fear,” “threat of
imminent death or serious harm,” force majeure, or similar
concepts, as well as jurisdictions that include certain other
provisions that more closely resemble duress defenses.
Results: 33/41 (80%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
more inclusive criteria for Necessity, including provisions
related to “irresistible force,” “threat of imminent harm,” force
majeure, or similar concepts, or which more closely resemble
duress defenses.
6. Duress / Compulsion
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available
codified laws of the jurisdiction allow for justification, excuse, or
reduced punishment if the act was committed under duress,
coercion, irresistible fear, or similar compulsory conditions?
Although the actual operation of these provisions may be
uncertain, jurisdictions that include such provisions are
included, unless homicide is specifically exempted.
Results: 32/41 (78%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
stated criteria for Duress / Compulsion.
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus
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jurisdictions that refer to “an unavoidable threat,” “necessary
evil,” or similar concepts, as well as jurisdictions that include
certain other provisions that more closely resemble necessity
defenses.
Results: 34/41 (83%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
more inclusive criteria for Duress / Compulsion, including
provisions related to “unavoidable threat,” “necessary evil,” or
similar concepts, or which more closely resemble necessity
defenses.
7. Provocation
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction
allow for justification, excuse or reduced punishment if the act
was provoked by the victim? Jurisdictions that include
provisions such as “heat of passion,” “under the influence of
violent emotions,” or similar concepts are included.
Results: 28/41 (68%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the
stated criteria for Provocation.
The main provisional results for each of these seven
categories are represented graphically in Figure 1. Stated in its
strongest form, the picture that emerges from this research is
that legal systems and therefore individuals throughout the
world recognize that intentional killing without justification or
excuse is prohibited, and that self-defense and insanity, and to a
lesser extent necessity, duress, and provocation, can sometimes
be potentially valid justifications or excuses. These are
noteworthy generalizations that to the best of my knowledge go
beyond anything comparable in the existing scientific or legal
literature in uncovering or at least beginning to illuminate the
properties of a specific universal or near-universal norm against
homicide. They also directly challenge the conventional relativist
assumption that although “[t]here are certain high-level themes
that one sees in the contents of moral norms in virtually all
human groups—themes such as harms, incest, helping and
sharing, social justice, and group defense . . . the specific rules
that fall under these themes exhibit enormous variability.”32

32

Sripada, supra note 28, at 330; cf. POSNER, supra note 28, at 6 (arguing that
“what counts as murder . . . varies enormously from society to society”).
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Figure 1: Universal Elements of the Homicide Prohibition (n = 41 jurisdictions)

In addition, these findings imply that at least some
technical legal definitions of prohibited acts and recognized
defenses may indeed capture the structure of common moral
intuitions.33 To this extent they lend support to the hypothesis
that human beings are “intuitive lawyers” who possess tacit or
implicit moral and legal knowledge and a natural ability to
compute structurally complex unconscious representations of
human acts and their components (the “moral grammar
hypothesis” that commentators have begun to debate in recent
years).34 For example, these findings reinforce and extend the
33

See John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the
Future, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 151 (2007).
34
See generally JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS’
LINGUISTIC ANALOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT
(2010); John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of
Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION, VOL. 50: MORAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 27-100 (D. Bartels et al.,
eds., 2009); John Mikhail, “Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face”: Jurisprudence
and H.L.A. Hart, 95 GEO. L. J. 733 (2007); see also, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,
EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2008); MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY
IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT (2006); MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE
DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG (2006); RAY JACKENDOFF,
LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MENTAL STRUCTURE (2009);
JESSE PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007); Monica Bucciarelli,
Sangeet Khemlani, & P. N. Johnson-Laird, The Psychology of Moral Reasoning, 3
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 121 (2008); Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob,
Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 373
(2007); Susan Dwyer, How Good is the Linguistic Analogy?, in THE INNATE MIND, VOL. 2:
CULTURE AND COGNITION 237-56 (Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich,
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discovery that three and four year-old children utilize what is, in
effect, a mala in se/mala prohibita distinction when making
moral judgments, distinguishing “genuine” or intrinsic moral
violations (e.g., battery, theft) from violations of social
conventions (e.g., wearing pajamas to school);35 that four and five
year-olds utilize what is, in effect, a mistake of law/mistake of
fact distinction in the same context, recognizing that false
factual beliefs can often serve to exculpate, but false moral
beliefs typically do not;36 that adults make moral judgments in
conformity with central doctrines of torts and criminal law,
relying in particular on three key principles that distill the
essence of the legal prohibition of purposeful battery: “(a) Harm
caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b)
harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm
foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving
physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no
physical contact”;37 and that specific brain regions, including the
right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, are selectively recruited during moral
judgment tasks that require sensitivity to an agent’s intentions,
such as cases of mistake, ignorance, impossible attempt, and
double effect.38
eds., 2006); Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct? 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 269
(2009); Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in
THE INNATE MIND, VOL. 1: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338-52 (Peter Carruthers, Stephen
Laurence & Stephen Stich, eds., 2005); Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law
and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006); Matthias Mahlmann, Theorizing Transnational
Law: Varieties of Transnational Law and the Universalistic Stance, 10 GERMAN L. J. 1325
(2009); Matthias Mahlmann, Ethics, Law, and the Challenge of Cognitive Science, 8
GERMAN L. J. 577 (2007); Greg Miller, The Roots of Morality, 320 SCIENCE 734 (2008);
Shaun Nichols, Innateness and Moral Psychology, in THE INNATE MIND, VOL 1:
STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS, supra at 353-69; Dennis Patterson, On the Conceptual and
the Empirical: A Critique of John Mikhail’s Cognitivism, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1053 (2008);
Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008; Paul H. Robinson,
Robert Kurzban, & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 1633 (2007); Stephen Stich, Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kluge? 6
JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND CULTURE 181 (2006).
35
See, e.g., ELLIOT TURIEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:
MORALITY AND CONVENTION (1983); Judith G. Smetana, Social Cognitive-Development:
Domain Distinctions and Coordinations, 3 DEV. REV. 131 (1983).
36
See, e.g., Michael J. Chandler, Bryan W. Sokal & Cecilia Wainryb, Beliefs
About Truth and Beliefs About Rightness, 71 CHILD DEV. 91 (2000); see also John Mikhail,
The Poverty of the Moral Stimulus, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL 1: THE EVOLUTION OF
MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 353-59 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., 2008).
37
Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17
PSYCH. SCI. 1082 (2006).
38
See, e.g., Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding
and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1912 (2008); Liane Young, Fiery A.
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Furthermore, these comparative data also point to a
variety of novel experimental protocols in anthropology,
cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and other
disciplines that could shed further light on the moral grammar
hypothesis. For example, our findings suggest that researchers
in these fields would benefit from relying more directly on legal
theory and actual legal cases to uncover the properties of the
mental representations implicit in common moral intuitions and
to describe their behavioral and neurological effects. Cases of
mistake, ignorance, attempt, double effect, self-defense,
necessity, negligence, proximate causation, and other familiar
doctrines should be the bread and butter of cognitive scientists
seeking to discover the structure of the moral mind, and these
researchers should rely more heavily on the sophisticated
theoretical vocabulary of the law to design and interpret the
results of their experiments. All of these conclusions and the
findings themselves should be approached cautiously, however,
and considered in light of several important caveats and
qualifications. In what follows, I briefly identify four such
considerations, leaving a more comprehensive discussion of
them for another occasion.
First, it is important to clarify at the outset that the goal
of our study is accurate description rather than prescription,
justification, or some other normative objective. Even if it were
true that all or most jurisdictions adopt one or another approach
to homicide, this fact by itself would not thereby commend or
justify that approach, nor is our present concern to address this
or any other normative issue.
Second, it seems equally important to emphasize that
familiar problems of classification, interpretation, and
terminology are serious and non-trivial in this context, as are
the more general problems of bias and ethnocentrism. Does
Western science, in this case Western jurisprudence, furnish
abstract concepts that can be fruitfully used to describe and
analyze social, legal, and mental phenomena in non-Western,
tribal, or small-scale societies, or does any such cultural
imposition lead inevitably to theoretical distortion and
confusion? Legal anthropologists and other researchers have
Cushman, Marc D. Hauser, & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between
Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 104 PROC. NAT ACAD. SCI 8235 (2007); see also
Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc
Hauser, & Antonio Damasio, Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral
Judgements, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).
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debated these and related topics at great length;39 however, the
issues remain unresolved, and the most plausible answers to
these vexed questions fall beyond the scope of this Essay. For
present purposes, I wish to avoid getting tangled in these
familiar methodological debates, while at the same time clearly
acknowledging their importance and the need to give them
serious and sustained consideration.
Third, one might justifiably raise several interrelated
concerns about the specific codes and analytical criteria utilized
in this study. For example, some of the codes seem clearly
outdated, and others seem likely to have been revised or
amended without our knowledge. Because of the large
expenditure of time and effort it took to locate a code for each
jurisdiction, it was not always possible to verify that its relevant
provisions were currently in effect in that jurisdiction. It must be
admitted, moreover, that the analytical criteria used thus far in
our research are crude and stand in need of further refinement.
As informed observers will recognize, many of the complexities
that occupy serious criminal law theory have been ignored or
deliberately pushed under the rug. So, too, there are countless
interpretive problems having to do with language and linguistic
diversity in a study like this, along with unavoidable pitfalls of
translation. “A primary goal of comparative law is to become
aware of the way in which language shapes legal culture,”
Professor Fletcher observes, “and doing so requires an
exploration of why some terms have a nearly universal meaning
and others are culturally specific.”40 Thus far, our study falls well
short of this exploration, and to that extent it seems clearly
deficient.
Finally, although a plausible argument can be made for
the proposition that codified legal norms are a useful source of
information from which to draw inferences about human
psychology,41 one should approach this endeavor cautiously.
Even with respect to the substantive criminal law, the number
39

For some valuable critical discussion of these issues, see, for example, Paul
Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 401-18 (Laura Nader ed., 1997); Max Gluckman, Concepts in the Comparative
Study of Tribal Law, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 349-73; Laura Nader,
Introduction, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 1-10; see also BROWN, supra
note 5, at ch. 1; Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of
Culture, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS ch.
1 (1973).
40
FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 24, at 118.
41
See generally Miller, supra note 34; see also Mikhail, Moral Grammar and
Intuitive Jurisprudence, supra note 34.
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and variety of factors that determine the form and substance of
such codes beggar the imagination. Evidently, the mind’s own
hidden rules of moral judgment are merely one of many
variables entering into this process. This complexity and the
resulting idealization that any such endeavor necessarily
assumes must be kept firmly in mind, particularly when one is
considering the possibility of relating universal features of
criminal law to features of human nature.42
Despite these and other important qualifications, it
seems clear that the provisional data presented in this Essay
bear directly on the question of moral universals and mark a
potentially significant turning point in our understanding of this
topic. The theoretical insight provided by the detailed analysis of
codified legal norms is real and substantial. Particularly when a
codified prohibition appears to exist and operate throughout the
world, this type of research serves to illustrate how the
systematic investigation of a richly structured norm can advance
the existing debate about moral universals beyond its ordinary
parameters. As this research project continues to unfold, it
seems likely that it will enable scientists to describe the mental
rules and representations underlying human moral intuitions
with much greater accuracy than has been heretofore possible.
Furthermore, the apparent universality or near-universality of
the homicide prohibition suggests, although it does not entail,
that the moral grammar hypothesis is sound, thereby
reinforcing the assumption that future research in moral
psychology should build on this naturalistic foundation.

42

On the other hand, it is important to note that because many jurisdictions
recognize particular defenses such as necessity, duress, and provocation through the
development of case law rather than codification, relying exclusively on codified elements
of the homicide prohibition may significantly understate the universality of these
defenses. If one were to research the case law in these jurisdictions, one might discover
that these defenses are recognized more frequently, perhaps even rivaling the data on
criminalization, intent, self-defense, and insanity/mental illness.

